L.S. Penrose was the first to propose a measure of voting power (which later came to be known as 'the [absolute] Banzhaf (Bz) index'). His limit theorem-which is implicit in his booklet (1952) and for which he gave no rigorous proof-says that in simple weighted voting games (WVGs), if the number of voters increases indefinitely while the quota is pegged at half the total weight, thenunder certain conditions-the ratio between the voting powers (as measured by him) of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights. We conjecture that the theorem holds, under rather general conditions, for large classes of variously defined WVGs, other values of the quota, and other measures of voting power. We provide proofs for some special cases. D
Introduction
In his (1946) paper, Lionel Penrose gave the first definition of a priori voting power. According to this definition, as slightly amended in his (1952) booklet the voting power of voter a equals the probability w a of a 'being able to influence a decision either way'. Here it is assumed a priori that all voters other than a vote independently of one another, each voting 'yes' and 'no' with equal probability; so that all divisions of those voters into 'yes' and 'no' camps are equiprobable. Then w a is the probability of the event that those voters are so divided that a's vote will tip the balance: if a votes 'yes' the act in question will be adopted, and if she/he votes 'no' the act will be blocked. 1 Penrose always assumes that decisions are subject to the simple majority rule, whereby each voter must vote either 'yes' or 'no' (so that no abstentions are admitted) and a proposed bill is adopted iff it receives over half of all votes. However, he allows the formation of blocs, so that a bloc-voter can have any positive integral number of votes. Thus the decision rules he considers are a special case of what is known in the votingpower literature as a 'weighted voting game' (WVG).
Let us recall briefly the definition of a WVG. A WVG W consists of a finite set N of voters together with an assignment of a non-negative real weight w x to each voter xaN, and a real qa(0, 1). A bill is passed under W iff the coalition (set of voters) A voting for it satisfies the condition:
We refer to N as the assembly of W and to q as the latter's relative quota. The whole righthand side of (1), namely q multiplied by the total weight of N, is the absolute quota, or simply the quota. Penrose confines his attention to the special case in which q equals or slightly exceeds (1/2). 2 For such WVGs, he derives in (1952) the following approximation for the voting power w a of voter a:
In deriving (2) he assumes that the number of voters is large, and w a is small compared with the sum S of all weights. 3 Note that as w a /S becomes vanishingly small, so do both sides of (2). Thus c must be taken to mean that the relative error of the approximation tends to 0; in other words, the ratio between the two sides tends to 1. Implicit in this approximation formula is a limit theorem about the behaviour of the ratio between the voting powers of any two voters, a and b: if the number of voters increases indefinitely, while existing voters always keep their old weights and the relative quota is pegged at 1/2, then (under suitable conditions):
1 We have stated the a priori assumption more fully than Penrose, who merely says that the other voters are assumed to act 'at random'. The definition he had given in (1946) took w a /2 rather than w a itself as a's voting power; the difference is of course inessential. Penrose's measure w is often referred to in the literature as 'the [absolute] Banzhaf index' and denoted by 'b V'. In using 'w' we are following Owen (1995) . 2 In fact, he seems to be thinking of (1) with > instead of z, and q = 1/2. We shall return to this minor point below; see Remark 2.4 (ii). 3 In stating (2) and the assumptions under which it is derived, we are paraphrasing Penrose. For his own formulations see his (1952, p. 715 ).
Penrose does not present a rigorous proof of (2) and (3), but merely outlines an argument, which is presumably based on some version of the central limit theorem of probability theory. Unfortunately, (2) or (3) do not always hold under the conditions assumed by Penrose. For example, let 0< w V< w, and for any positive integer n put:
Thus, voters 2, . . ., n +1 have the same weight, which is greater than that of voter 1; and a bill is adopted iff it receives at least (and hence in fact more than) half the total weight. 4 Clearly, for any fixed n the voting powers w i [W (n) ], for i=2, . . ., n+1, are positive and equal to one another. But:
w 2 ½W ðnÞ if n is even:
Hence (3) does not hold in this case for a= 1 and b >1. Nevertheless, experience suggests that such counter-examples are atypical, contrived exceptions. Both real-life and randomly generated WVGs with many voters provide much empirical evidence that (3) holds in most cases, as a general rule: if the distribution of weights is not too skewed (in other words, the ratio of the largest weight to the smallest is not very high), then the relative powers of the voters tend to approximate closely to their respective relative weights. Moreover, this is the case not only for multi-voter WVGs with q =1/2, but also for those with any qa (0, 1).
By the relative power of voter a in a WVG W we mean here a's Banzhaf (briefly, Bz) index b, obtained by normalising (or relativising) the Penrose measure:
Similarly, a's relative weightw a in W is obtained by dividing a's weight by the total weight of all voters:
The typical tendency of the values of b to approximate to the respective relative weights in multi-voter WVGs is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. The WVGs shown in these tables are taken from Felsenthal and Machover (2001) . Both are decision rules designed for the so-called qualified majority voting (QMV) in the EU's Council of Ministers following its prospective enlargement to 27 member states. N 27 (Table 1) is prescribed in the Treaty of Nice (2001); 5 Rule B (Table 2) is a 'benchmark' rule proposed in Felsenthal and Machover (2001) .
In each of these tables, column (1) gives the weights of the voters. The absolute and relative quota are stated at the bottom of the table. Column (2) gives the respective relative weightsw as percentages. Column (3) gives the relative voting powers as measured by the Bz index b, also in percentage terms. Column (4) gives the ratio of the Bz index to the respective relative weight. Note that all the figures in this column are quite close to 1. In Table 1 they are well within the range 1F0.1. In Table 2 -where the quota is nearer half the total weight-the approximation is even better: the ratios are all well within the range 1F0.01. Table 1 QMV under N 27 The same tendency is also apparent in Table 3 , which is based on a WVG model of the Electoral College that elects the President of the US. The figures for b are quite close to those forw.
Moreover, a similar phenomenon is observable not only for the Bz index, but for also for some other indices of voting power, notably the Shapley -Shubik (briefly, S -S) index /. 6 This typical behaviour of / is also illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. In these tables, column (5) gives the values of the S -S index / in percentage terms and column (6) gives the ratio of these values to the respective relative weights. Note that all these ratios are well within the range 1F0.05. The same tendency is evident also in Table 3 : compare the figures for / with those forw. This suggests a general problem: under what conditions does the ratio of the voting powers of any two voters, as measured by a given index, converge to the ratio of their weights?
In order to make this problem more precise, let us introduce the following framework.
be an infinite increasing chain of finite non-empty sets, and let
Let w be a function that assigns to each aaN a positive real number w a as weight; and let q be a real a(0, 1).
For each naN let W (n) be the WVG whose assembly is N (n) -each voter aaN (n) being endowed with the pre-assigned weight w a -and whose relative quota is q. We shall then say that {W (n) } n = 0 l is a q-chain of WVGs. Further, let n be an index of voting power. We shall say that Penrose's Limit Theorem (PLT) holds for the q-chain {W (n) } n = 0 l with respect to the index n if for any a, baN lim n!l n a ½W ðnÞ
Remark 1.2.
(i) In what follows, whenever we shall refer to a q-chain {W (n) } n = 0 l , we shall assume that the N (n) , N and w are as specified in Definition 1.1: N (n) is the assembly of W (n) , N is given by (9), and w is the weight function.
(ii) Note that n a [W (n) ]/n b [W (n) ] in (10) is undefined if ag N (n) or b g N (n) , but this does not matter because a, baN (n) for all sufficiently large n. (iii) Definition 1.1 may be extended to weighted ternary voting games, in which voters have the option of abstaining-cf. Machover (1997, 1998) . The only change that needs to be made to the definition is that each W (n) , instead of being a (binary) WVG, is the ternary decision rule whereby a bill is passed iff the total weight of those voting for it is at least q times the total weight of those voting against it. Of course, n must then be an index defined for such games.
In preparation for what follows, we introduce two items of notation. First, note that if aa N (n) the relative weight of a in W (n) -unlike a's absolute weight w a -depends on n. We denote this relative weight byw ðnÞ a ; thus:
Second, for each aaN we put:
The members of N a (n) have the same weight as a, and we shall therefore refer to them as replicas of a.
PLT for replicative q-chains and the S -S index
In this section, we shall prove that PLT holds with respect to the S -S index for a special class of chains. The main special property of these chains is that each aaN is eventually (that is, for sufficiently large n) accompanied by sufficiently many replicas in N n . Let us make this more precise.
Definition 2.1. We shall say that the q-chain {W (n) } n = 0 l is replicative if it satisfies the following two conditions. First, lim n!l maxfw ðnÞ a : a a N ðnÞ g ¼ 0:
Second, for each a a N there is a positive constant C a such that for all sufficiently large n X xaN ðnÞ aw ðnÞ
Remark 2.2. Condition (13) is essentially the one assumed by Penrose: the relative weight of each individual voter becomes negligibly small. This condition is automatically satisfied if the values of w are bounded from above and bounded away from 0. The second condition (14) ensures that nevertheless, the total relative weight of the voter's replicas does not become negligibly small.
Remark 2.4. In the definition of WVG, the blunt inequality z in (1) can be replaced by a sharp inequality >. The two definitions are equivalent: they determine the same class of structures. However, the relative quota q of a WVG in the blunt sense may not work for the sharp sense, but may need to be slightly adjusted (and vice versa). Consequently, the corresponding definitions of q-chain and replicative q-chain in the sharp sense do not yield the same classes as our present Definition 1.1 and Definition 2.1. Nevertheless, Theorem 2.3 applies to replicative q-chains in the sharp sense as well, because Neyman's result, on which our proof depends, also covers this case-see Neyman (1981, Lemma 3.2) .
PLT for some 1/2-chains and the Banzhaf index
Given a q-chain {W (n) } n = 0 l of WVGs (see Definition 1.1), we associate with it the family { Y x : xa N } of independent random variables indexed by N, such that for every aaN,
We consider the chain YwffY x : xaN ðnÞ g : naNg ð 21Þ of (finite) sets of these random variables. For any a a N let us put: 
Using the definition of the Y a it is easy to obtain the following explicit expressions for l Ia (n) and r Ia (n) .
Finally, using (6) we get:
as claimed. 5
Combining (30) and (25) 
This is our slightly improved version of Penrose's approximation formula (2). Of course, if-as Penrose assumes-each individual weight w a becomes relatively negligible, then the difference between the two approximations is likewise negligible. 5
Remark 3.5. Owen (1995, pp. 272, 297) gives approximation formulas for w as well as for / in multi-voter WVGs. His approximations are based on an interval version of the central limit theorem (as opposed to the local form used by us), and are stated without proof and without specifying the precise conditions under which they hold. 7 Nevertheless, the numerical approximations he obtains for the Penrose powers / of the bloc-voters in the US Presidential Electoral College-shown in the last column of Table XII.4.1 of Owen (1995, p. 297 )-are closer than ours, which are based on (33) above and shown in the last column of our Table 3 . (The exact values of w, correct to six decimal figures, are shown in the penultimate column of Table 3 ).
As an example of an application of Proposition 3.3, we prove the following:
Theorem 3.6. Let fW ðnÞ g l n ¼ 0 be a 1/2-chain such that its weight function w assumes only finitely many values, all of them positive integers; and such that the greatest common divisor of those values w a that occur infinitely often is 1. Then the associated chain Y satisfies the SLCL condition. Hence PLT holds for fW ðnÞ g l n ¼ 0 with respect to the Bz index. Also, (33) holds. 7 Rigorous validation of these approximations is not straightforward. In cases where the approximation is expected to hold, both the relative voting power of each voter and the term approximating it tend to 0 as the number of voters increases. In order to validate the approximation, it must be proved not only that the error term-the difference between the true value and the approximating term-also tends to 0, but that it does so faster than the approximating term. Let N + be the set of positive integers and consider the Cartesian product space:
Each member of W is then an infinite sequence of the form ( q; w 0 , w 1 , . . .) where qa(0, 1) and the w n are positive integers. Such a sequence gives rise to a q-chain {W (n) } l n=0 , where N (n) ={0, 1, . . ., n} for each naN.
Further, we can regard W as a product probability space by taking (0, 1) with the Lebesgue probability measure, and each copy of N + with a reasonable probability distribution: say a geometric distribution (Prob{k}= 2 Àk ), or a Poisson distribution (Prob{k}=e À1 /(kÀ1)!).
Or, instead of confining ourselves to integer weights, we can allow arbitrary positive real weights. To this end we can replace N + by the set R + of positive reals, with some reasonable probability measure on each copy-using, say, a Gaussian density f on the positive half-line:
It now makes precise sense to talk about the probability that PLT holds, with respect to a given index, for the chain corresponding to a randomly chosen member of W.
We conjecture that PLT holds with probability 1 with respect to both the S -S and the Bz index.
